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LABOR LAW-SUPERVISORS-University of Chicago v.
National Labor Relations Board-The Seventh Circuit
Affirms a National Labor Relations Board-Created
Hybrid Employee-Supervisor Category under the
National Labor Relations Act.
Legislative enactments are the product of society's attempt to find
solutions to the problems facing its citizens. As the situations being
dealt with become more complicated, so do the legislative remedies.
One method frequently chosen by legislative bodies to solve given cir-
cumstances is to categorize the populace and apply restrictions or
grant benefits to the resulting groups. Frequently, changing condi-
tions and values outpace corrective legislation. An example is the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,1 which carefully delineates both the indi-
viduals included within the Act's protection and those persons excluded
from its coverage.2 The recent decision of University of Chicago v. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board3 demonstrates the practical difficulties
that arise when seeking to apply the Act to a "hybrid employee"-a
worker who does not readily fit within any of the Act's enumerated
employer-employee categories.
HISTORY OF THE CASE
University of Chicago v. National Labor Relations Board resulted
from an effort of the National Council, Distributive Workers of Amer-
ica, to organize the 600 professional and nonprofessional employees of
the University of Chicago Libraries.' In March of 1971, Local 103
filed a representation petition5 with the National Labor Relations
1. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Act].
2. For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 39 through 43, 47 and 96
infra.
3. 506 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1974) (decision without published opinion pursuant to
Seventh Circuit Rule 28, see Appendix, at p. 773 infra).
4. See 205 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 83 L.R.R.M. 1678, 1680 (1970).
5. Petition was filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970), and regulations
thereto.
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Boards seeking the creation of a bargaining unit comprised of both
professional and nonprofessional employees. The Regional Director of
the N.L.R.B. dismissed the petition 7 having determined that super-
visors had been involved in the union's organizational compaign.8 Such
supervisory interference tainted the union's showing of support.' Local
103 thereafter promptly transformed itself into Local 103A for pro-
fessional employees, and Local 103B for nonprofessionals. 10
In December of 1971, Local 103A filed a representation petition, 1
seeking a bargaining unit comprised solely of professional librarians.
A hearing was held in which the supervisory status of several profes-
sionals was the main issue.' 2 Also at issue was whether librarians who
supervised only clerical staff, and who would be part of Local 103B,
should be excluded from the professional unit. 13 The issues were not
resolved at the representation hearing level,' 4 because a library em-
ployee filed an unfair labor practice charge against the University.
This 8(a)(2) charge'" alleged that the University was in violation of
the National Labor Relations Act 16 through its interference with the
union's formation, since nine library supervisors were participants in
that formulation. The Board reviewed the charge and issued a formal
complaint against the University.' 7
Upon the filing of the complaint, the case took an unusual turn.
The University admitted all of the substantive allegations in the
6. The National Labor Relations Board is established under 29 U.S.C. § 153
(1970). The Board has authority to make determinations as to the composition of a
proposed bargaining unit as well as to provide hearings to resolve representation ques-
tions. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
7. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.63 (1974).
8. See 205 N.LR.B. No. 44, 83 L.R.R.M. 1678, 1680 (1973).
9. See Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.LR.B. 670, 673 (1948).
10. 205 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 83 L.R.R.M. 1678, 1680 (1973).
11. National Labor Relations Board Case No. 13-RC-12404.
12. 205 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 83 L.R.R.M. 1678, 1680 (1973).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2) (1970). Under this section, it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer to "dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it .... ." By Board
practice, a violation of section 8(a)(2) results in the disestablishment of the union if
employer domination is found, and a new election if "merely" interference is found. See
Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670 (1948). For purposes of this section, "employer"
includes an agent of the employer, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970), and is not limited to
the authorized acts of that agent, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970); accord, International As-
sociation of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940); H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311
U.S. 514 (1941).
To find interference, therefore, as was charged in University of Chicago, it was first
necessary for the Board to hold that some of the prospective unit members were super-
visors.
16. See note 1 supra.
17. Once the Board issues a complaint, determination of the matter is by an adminis-
trative law judge. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1974).
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Board's complaint.'" As a result, in the hearing before the administra-
tive law judge, 19 the positions normally advocated by the parties were
reversed. The University argued that the nine individuals were super-
visors and, therefore, the University had violated the Act. The union
contended that the University was not in breach, since the nine people
involved were not supervisors. The Board's General Counsel con-
curred with the University's contention.2 0 A finding was entered that
five of the nine librarians acted in a supervisory capacity.2 However,
the judge held that the issues considered during the course of the
hearing were more appropriately raised at the representation level,
and, consequently, dismissed the complaint. 22
On appeal, the Board determined that all nine librarians were su-
pervisors-four supervised professional employees and five super-
vised nonprofessionals.2 3 The Board held that the conduct of the lat-
ter group was not violative of section 8(a)(2), since the policy of the
Act was to protect the employees' jobs from their organizational
rights:
The possibility that the professional librarians would be coerced by
the organizational activities of other professional librarians who also,
by the nature of their duties, supervise only employees outside of
the unit, is too remote to justify limiting the Section 7 rights of such
employees. Moreover, where an individual's principal duties are
of the same nature as that of other unit employees, the exercise of
supervisory authority outside the unit sought does not so ally such
an employee as to create a conflict of interest.
The same considerations do not apply to conduct engaged in by
[the clerical supervisors] . . . . These four individuals supervise
professional librarians, and the possibility is certainly greater that
some of the unit employees would be afraid to oppose views ex-
pressed by supervisors for fear of antagonizing the people who
possess effective control over promotions, raises, and other terms
and conditions of their employment. 24
The concept that supervisors may actively participate in rank-and-file
union organizational campaigns is contrary to previous Board
decisions.25
18. Appendix to Petitioner's Brief to Review and Modify at 8-9, University of Chi-
cago v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1974).
19. 29 C.F.R. § 102.63-.64 (1974).
20. The General Counsel has authority over the Board's legal staff and has final au-
thority to investigate and prosecute unfair labor practice charges. 29- U.S.C. § 153(d)
(1970).
21. See 205 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 83 L.R.R.M. 1678, 1681 (1973).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See discussion accompanying notes 120 through 122 infra.
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Thereafter, the Seventh Circuit denied the University's reversing
petition, and granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement of
its order.2" The court affirmed both the holding that all nine were su-
pervisors, as well as the Board's determination that supervisors may
be entitled to section 7 rights:2 7
[T]he Board's conclusion that the activities of the five supervisors
who only supervised nonprofessionals did not constitute unfair
labor practices was reasonable. The Board's concern was that
these five supervisors were also employees and therefore entitled to
section 7 rights. 29 U.S.C. § 157. In balancing the Union's need
to be free from employer interference with the right of employees
to organize, the Board's decision that professional librarians would
not be coerced by other professionals who supervise only employees
outside the Union is reasonable.2 8
The court thus concluded that under certain circumstances, supervi-
sors and employees could be members of the same bargaining unit.
PROPER PLACE TO RAISE THE ISSUE
In University of Chicago, the question of supervisory status was
raised in the context of an unfair labor practice charge. In most cases,
that question is raised in the representation hearing. 29
Once an 8(a)(2) charge is filed, the Board will not begin or con-
tinue processing a representation petition.30  Filing an 8(a)(2)
charge while a representation hearing is in progress is, therefore,
known as a "blocking charge."31 The suspension by the Board of the
representation hearing is an internal N.L.R.B. policy that has been
mandated neither by the Act nor by the courts, and has been criticized
by unions as a management tactic to delay recognition of a given un-
ion.32 Such a charge was made by the union in the instant case:
[T]he real issue herein is not the University's alleged assistance to
the Union but the exploitation of the Board's unfair labor practice
hearing and appeals process to avoid recognition of the Union. 33
The statements made by both the Board and the Seventh Circuit
appear to leave open the possibility that the supervisory question will
26. 506 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1974).
27. See text accompanying notes 40 through 41 infra.
28. See Appendix at p. 774 infra.
29. See, e.g., Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958).
30. Id. See also cases cited note 39 infra.
31. Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 2.60 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1958).
32. Id.
33. Brief for Intervenor Distributive Workers of America at 3, University of Chicago
v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 1402 (7th Cir. 1974).
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be re-litigated in the representation hearing. The Board stated that in
reaching its decision no specific findings regarding unit inclusion
were being made. 4 The Seventh Circuit similarly limited the effects
of its supervisory holding:
[T]he determination of the supervisory status of the nine individ-
uals is specifically limited to this unfair labor practice proceeding
and will not affect any determination of supervisory status in a
representation case concerning the University and Local 103A.3 5
The possibility of re-litigation of supervisory status in a new repre-
sentation hearing raises the point that after 3 years of litigation, the
case may be no closer to completion than when it began. Of course,
any findings as to the composition of the unit may be appealed as a
matter of right through the Board and the courts, although the Uni-
versal Camera doctrine 6 may serve as a deterrent to such appeals.
Nonetheless, as the union contended, there is an inference of delaying
tactics involved here. The result in this case seems to imply that future
unions should discourage union organizational activities by persons
who arguably could be claimed to be supervisors by the employer.
Otherwise, the union's organizational campaign could be derailed by
the filing of an 8(a)(2) charge.
On the other hand, had the case gone through the representation
hearing level first, with a finding that none of the contested people
were supervisors, the employer would be placed in an awkward posi-
tion. If the employer disagreed with those findings, its only recourse
would be to refuse to bargain in good faith, as certification of a bar-
gaining unit is not reviewable by the courts. 7 The resulting 8(a)(5)
charge 8 filed by the union would then give an opportunity to the em-
ployer to air its grievances as to the composition of the bargaining
unit. Thus, it is easy to understand why the blocking charge has been
criticized, 9 and it is submitted that the Board should review its policy
in this area.
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The key provision of the National Labor Relations Act, section 7,40
34. See 205 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 83 L.R.R.M. 1678, 1680 n.4 (1973).
35. See Appendix at p. 774, infra.
36. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See text accompany-
ing note 65 infra.
37. See AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
38. Refusal to bargain in good faith is governed by 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
39. See, e.g., Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co., 444 F.2d 1064, 1068 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1971); Surrat v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1972).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
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grants employees the right to organize into labor unions and to bar-
gain collectively:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection .... 41
This protection is clearly granted only to employees. Other sections of
the Act, however, indicate that a supervisor may not be "an employ-
ee" within the framework of the Act. Section 2(11)42 defines supervi-
sors as:
[A]ny individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such ac-
tion, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such au-
thority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment.
Section 14(a), 8 while allowing supervisors to become members of la-
bor organizations, does not compel the employer to treat them as
"employees." An "employee" is defined by section 2(3) 4 as not in-
cluding "any individual employed as a supervisor . . . ." A reading
of these various sections indicates that supervisors do not have section
7 rights. One of the reasons that Congress denied these organiza-
tional rights to supervisors, was to insure that group's loyalty to
management.
Prior to the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act, 45 confusion
existed with regard to the status of supervisors, because the original
Wagner Act 6 definitions of "employer" and "employee," overlapped,
and there was no separate definition for "supervisor. '47 As a result,
the Board vacillated in its interpretation of the definitions and, con-
41. Id.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970) reads, in pertinent part: "[N]o employer subject
to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors
as employees for the purpose of any law. . . relating to collective bargaining."
44. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
45. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
46. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449.
47. Employee was defined as "any employee" excluding agricultural laborers, domes-
tic servants or employees of parents or spouses. While there was no definition of "su-
pervisor," "employer" was defined as "any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly .... ." Thus, an "employee" could act at least "indirectly" on be-
half of his employer, while not having any of the authority or other attributes of man-
agement. Ch. 372, § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
763
Loyola University Law Journal
comitantly, with respect to the breadth of the group protected under
the Wagner Act. Thus, in Union Colleries Coal Company,48 super-
visors were afforded the protection of the Act; in Maryland Drydock
Company,49 they were not; and in Packard Motor Car Company," they
were again afforded protection. Packard took unsuccessful appeals to
both the Sixth Circuit51 and the United States Supreme Court. 2 Con-
gress disagreed with the Board's interpretation in Packard, as evi-
denced by the 1946 attempt to remove supervisors from the Act's pro-
tection." After passage by the Congress, the exclusion died when
President Truman vetoed the bill.54
During consideration of the Taft-Hartley 5 amendments the follow-
ing year, supervisory status was again a congressional concern. The
Senate Report, in its version of the bill,5" listed elimination of the
"genuine supervisor from the coverage of the Act as an employee" as
one of the six major changes to be made in the Wagner Act:
A recent development which probably more than any other single
factor has upset any real balance of power in the collective bar-
gaining process has been the successful efforts of labor organiza-
tions to invoke the Wagner Act for covering supervisory personnel,
traditionally regarded as part of management, into organizations
composed of or subservient to the unions of the very men they were
hired to supervise.5 7
In addition, the House Report stated that the intent of the amendment
was to remove supervisors from the Act's coverage. 58 The history of
48. Union Colleries Coal Company, 41 N.L.R.B. 961 (1942).
49. Maryland Drydock Company, 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
50. Packard Motor Car Company, 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
51. NLRB v. Packard Motor Car Company, 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946).
52. Packard Motor Car Company v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947). The Court held
that supervisors were not "forbidden the protection of the Act when they take collective
action to protect their collective interests." Id. at 489. For a detailed discussion of this
pre-amendment period, see Moore, The National Labor Relations Act and Supervisors,
21 LABOR LAw JouRNAL 195 (1970).
53. 92 CONG. REc. 1029 (1946). The wording of the proposed definition was as
follows:
Sec. 12. Supervisory employees: (a) As used in this section the term "super-
visory employee" means an employee whose primary duties consist of-(1) the direction or supervision of the activities of other employees but who
regularly do no productive manual work; or(2) the computation of the pay of other employees and does not include per-
sons who are selected by productive workers under established practice; or(3) the determination of the time worked by other employees, or the super-
vision or administration of the factors on the basis of which the pay of other
employes is computed ...
54. See 1946 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE at 1686.
55. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq., ch. 120, 61
Stat. 136 (1947).
56. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1947).
57. Id.
58. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1947).
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the Board's vacillating position on the subject was discussed by the
members of both houses of Congress. Throughout the discussion,
Congress considered the desirability of relieving all possibility of a su-
pervisor's "divided loyalty."59 House minority Congressmen stated:
The issue of the inability of the supervisory employee, who is
unionized, to discharge his functions with loyalty and competency
is constantly raised. This issue may be partially met by providing
that supervisors are entitled to organize and bargain collectively
with their employers provided that they do not belong to the union
to which the production employees of the employer belong, or to
any union dominated or controlled by the union to which the pro-
duction employees belong.60
It should be noted that members of both houses rejected the concept
of supervisory and rank-and-file personnel being contained in the
same unit. When Representative Gwinn, speaking on behalf of spon-
sor Hartley, was asked if section 2(11) would "absolutely prohibit af-
filiation [by supervisors] with a rank and file union," he replied, "It
does."" Even a proposal by the Senate Minority to emasculate the
proposed supervisory definition prohibited applying the Act's cover-
age to supervisors "when they also represent rank and file
workers. 6 2
A reading of the debates on the Taft-Hartley Act discloses that
Congress' concern about labor-management problems was limited to
those problems in an industrial context. 63 Apparently, no considera-
tion was given either to the "hybrid" employees, who had occasional
managerial attributes, or to employees within a university context.
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2(11)
The N.L.R.B. has had the opportuuity to apply the Act, and the
courts have had occasion to decide questions of supervisory status
through their power of review. 4 The scope of judicial review, how-
ever, is somewhat limited by the Universal Camera doctrine 5 which
requires affirmance if the Board's finding is supported by substantial
evidence viewing the record as a whole. In addition, the Supreme
59. Id. at 16; S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1947).
60. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1947).
61. 93 CONG. REc. 3443 (1947).
62. Id. at 4904.
63. See generally NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS Acr OF 1947.
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (1970).
65. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1950); accord, Warner v.
NLRB, 365 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1966).
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Court has recognized the Board's expertise in the application of the
Act to the "complexities of industrial life,"66 and the respect due to a
Board determination. 7
Shortly after the passage of the Act, the Supreme Court remanded
a supervisory question to the Sixth Circuit which had been decided
prior to the Act's passage.68 The lower court held that participation in
any of the acts enumerated in section 2(11) would render an individ-
ual a supervisor.6 9 It was further held that the amendments concern-
ing employees were constitutional.70 Finally, the court concluded that
under the Labor Management Relations Act, employers were free to
not only discharge supervisors for joining a union, but could interfere
with their union activities.7
Strict interpretations of the statutory definition began to erode with
Great Western Sugar.7 2 This early Board decision concerned "hybrid"
employees: staff who spent part of their time in supervisory activities
and the remainder in rank-and-file. The individuals in question in
that case exercised authority full-time during 85 to 120 days a year
and exercised no such authority the rest of the year. The Board distin-
guished this situation from that of partial authority exercised the full
year allowing "seasonal supervisors" to maintain full membership in a
rank-and-file union. Membership was limited, however, to that which
reflected rank-and-file duties. 73 This limitation, it was suggested,
avoided the charges of conflict of interest-since there would not be
two masters served at the same time.74 The Board considered irrele-
vant the fact that both masters would be aware of the dual status, and,
therefore, neither side would be trustful of the supervisors. The
Board regarded this problem as "commonplace whenever an employ-
er decides to promote a rank-and-file employee."76 The N.L.R.B. did
not consider the fact that the commonplace promotions involved were
always followed by demotions, and that as a result the individuals'
66. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963).
67. Id.; see also NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International, 361 U.S. 477, 499(1960).
68. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 332 U.S. 840 (1947).
69. NLRB v. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 1948). See also text ac-
companying note 42 supra.
70. 169 F.2d at 577.
71. id. at 579; accord, NLRB v. Brown and Sharpe Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 331 (lst
Cir. 1948).
72. 137 N.L.R.B. 551 (1962).
73. Id. at 553.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 554.
766
Vol. 6: 75 8
Case Comments
loyalties were probably in a constant state of flux. Finally, it was not-
ed that the difficulty was with the determination of the proper individ-
uals, not the proper duties within the unit.77  Great Western Sugar
points out the problems confronting the Board when employees can-
not be neatly placed within the statutory definition; even earlier, hy-
brid personnel in the construction industry had been granted similar
status.78 The constant shifting of jobs within that industry, it was not-
ed, led a worker to supervisory duties one week, and nonsupervisory
duties the next.
By 1961, an even greater erosion of the strict exclusion of supervi-
sors from rank-and-file bargaining units had begun. In that year, the
First Circuit held in NLRB v. Swift and Company:79
[G]radations of authority "responsibly to direct" the work of
others from that of general manager or other top executive to straw
boss are so infinite and subtle that of necessity a large measure of
informed discretion is involved in the exercise by the Board of its
primary function to determine those who as a practical matter fall
within the statutory definition of a "supervisor."80
In Local 636, Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry v. NLRB,"1 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit supported the Board's practice 2 of allowing
a supervisor to retain rank-and-file union membership in the con-
struction industry, even while acknowledging that it was the purpose
of the 1947 amendments to prevent the association of supervisors and
rank-and-file members in the same union. 3 The court did, however,
object to participation by hybrid employees in union bargaining
teams.84
In 1970, the Seventh Circuit also approved a formula test which al-
lowed supervisors in the same bargaining unit as employees. Westing-
house Electric Corp. v. NLRB 5 involved engineers who occasionally
became "lead" engineers on various Westinghouse installation
projects.8 6 Relying on Great Western,"7 the Board allowed the engi-
77. Id.
78. Nassau and Suffolk Contractor's Ass'n, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957).
79. 292 F.2d 561 (lst Cir. 1961).
80. Id. at 563.
81. 287 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
82. See Nassau and Suffolk Contractor's Ass'n, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957).
83. See Local 636, Plumbing and Pipefitting Ind. v. NLRB, 287 F.2d 354, 361 (D.C.
Cir. 1961 ).
84. Id. at 362.
85. 424 F.2d 1151 (7thCir. 1970).
86. An engineer was classified as a supervisor if 50 percent of the toal working time
was spent as a "lead" engineer. Id. at 1157-58.
87. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
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neers in question to be members in the same unit as nonprofessional
employees.88 Although distinguishing between full supervisory status
during part of the year and partial supervisory status during the entire
year, the Board had thus gone far beyond Great Western.89 The court
affirmed this Board-created extension of the supervisory group which
was allowed to maintain its rank-and-file union membership:
[T]he board has a duty to employees to be alert not to construe
supervisory status too broadly because the employee who is
deemed a supervisor is denied employee rights which the act is in-
tended to protect . . . . We think that the board's formula in the
peculiar circumstances here reasonably protects the legitimate in-
terests of the employer and employees. 90
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB 91 represented a change from
the Seventh Circuit's earlier opinion that the Board could only enter
findings of fact as to whether an employee fell within the statutory
definition of the word "supervisor." 92
UNIVERSITY APPLICATION
University-related cases under the Act are new to the labor scene.
Prior to 1970, the Board refused to exercise jurisdiction over colleges
and universities because they were nonprofit institutions whose activi-
ties were of a noncommercial nature.93 However, in Cornell Universi-
ty,94 the N.L.R.B. decided that the growth of higher education and
the increasingly important federal economic support given to those in-
stitutions dictated its exercise of jurisdiction over the area.95 While the
Board had determined cases concerning professionals 96 such as pi-
88. 424 F.2d at 1157.
89. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
90. 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7thCir. 1970).
91. 424 F.2d 1151 (7thCir. 1970).
92. NLRB v. Esquire, Inc., 222 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1955).
93. See, e.g., Trustees of Columbia University, 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 427 (1951). The
Board may decline to assume jurisdiction over various classes of employers if the Board
finds that the effect of the labor dispute on commerce is insubstantial. 29 U.S.C. § 164
(c)(1) (1970).
94. 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). For a discussion of the background and effects of
the Board's decision to accept jurisdiction over colleges, see Schramm, Effects of NLRB
Jurisdictional Change on Union Organizing in Private Colleges and Universities, 23
LABOR LAW JOURNAL 572 (1972).
95. 183 N.L.R.B. at 332.
96. A professional is defined by the Act as one engaged primarily in intellectual
work, utilizng discretion, having knowledge of an advanced type, and the work output
of such an employee cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time. 29
U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970). A professional loses the Act's protection if that person is
also found to be a supervisor. See Kahn, The N.L.R.B. and Higher Education: The
Failure of Policy Making Through Adjudication, 21 U.C.L.A. L REv. 63, 119 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Kahn].
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lots,97 nurses,98 architects,9 9 and engineers, 100 as far as academia was
concerned, the N.L.R.B. recognized that it was travelling upon "un-
charted waters."'' 1
After Cornell University, the Board found in C. W. Post Center of
Long Island University'0 2 that full-time professional teaching duties
interspersed with quasi-supervisory authority did not render the pro-
fessors in question supervisors. The 27 librarians involved were in-
cluded within the unit, as no contention was made that they were su-
pervisors.103 Excluded from the bargaining unit, however, was the
library director who hired and supervised all nonprofessional
employees.
Fordham University'" concerned the creation of a unit of all uni-
versity professional employees. During the course of its opinion, the
Board reaffirmed its position that a faculty member's status was that
of a professional, and not a section 2(11) supervisor.'0 5 However, of
greater importance to the hybrid employee considerations of this arti-
cle was the Board's treatment of the University's contention that the
law school librarian's participation in the union's authorization cam-
paign had tainted the union's showing of support." 6 The Board did
not even determine whether the librarian was a section 2(11) super-
visor, but only that he did not supervise any employees that would be
in the proposed bargaining unit. 0 As a result, the Board held that
the librarian did not taint the union's showing. No case law was cited
to support this finding. Thus, in the first university decision where the
status of a hybrid employee was raised, the Board stated, quite per-
functorily, that a supervisor may participate in the same unit as rank-
and-file employees, as long as the employees are not under the authori-
ty of that supervisor.
New York University.. was an organizing situation similar to that
in Fordham University. The employer university contended that all li-
97. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 97 N.L.R.B. 929 (1951).
98. See, e.g., Doctor's Hospital of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950 (1970).
99. See, e.g., Wurster, Bernardi and Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1971).
100. See, e.g., Western Electric Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1960).
101. Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 41, 44 (1970). See also C.W. Post Center
of Long Island University, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1970); Kahn, supra note 96, at 84-
85.
102. 189 N.L.R.B. 904 (1970).
103. Id. at 906.
104. 193 N.LR.B. 134 (1971).
105. Id. at 136.
106. Id. at 134 n.6.
107. Id.
108. 205 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 83 L.R.R.M. 1549 (1973), injunction denied, 364 F.
Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Under the doctrine of Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184
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brarians were supervisors because they exercised sufficient superviso-
ry authority."' The Board cited Adelphi University for the proposi-
tion that the supervisor exclusion is aimed primarily at situations
where the authority in question is exercised over employees seeking
inclusion within the unit."' The Board applied a 50 percent test."'
As a result, only those librarians who supervised other employees who
would be within the proposed unit, or those employees who spent
more than 50 percent of their time supervising non-unit employees
were held to be supervisors.
In deciding University of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit relied upon
Adelphi University."' In Adelphi University, as in Fordham Univer-
sity, the employer university challenged the union's representation pe-
tition as tainted by supervisory participation. It was claimed that de-
partment chairmen, sequence chairmen 1 3 and program directors
were supervisors within the meaning of the Act. The Board found
that the authority possessed by the above personnel to effectively rec-
ommend the hiring and firing of part-time faculty and to allocate
merit increases rendered them supervisors."' However, the Board
specifically found that the director of admissions was not a supervisor,
noting that the fact that he had a secretary did not render him a super-
visor." 5 The focus, rather, was on the scope of the authority exercised
by the contested employee.
The court's reliance upon Adelphi University in University of Chi-
cago is misplaced. In the former decision, the director of admissions
was specifically held by the Board not to be a statutory supervisor
within the Act. He was held to have lacked authority to assign work to
the faculty members involved in the school's admissions effort. In ad-
dition, his hire-fire authority over his secretary was held insufficient to
cloak him with supervisory authority. In the latter case, all of the nine
library workers were specifically found to be supervisors, since they
all controlled or directed the acts of other library employees. Thus,
the Board's holding as to the admissions director's status in Adelphi
(1958), the district courts may review a Board decision when the Board acts, by its own
admission, contrary to a specific statutory prohibition. In New York University v.
NLRB, 364 F. Supp. at 165, the court found no such admission.
109. 205 N.LR.B. No. 16, 83 LRR.M. at 153.
110. Id.
111. See text accompanying notes 85 through 86 supra.
112. 195 N.L.R.B. 639 (1972).
113. A sequence chairman is a department chairman in the University's School of
Social Work. 195 N.L.R.B. at 642.
114. Id. at 643.
115. Id.
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University does not support the court's determination of the librari-
ans' status in University of Chicago.
However, the Seventh Circuit could have safely relied upon another
discussion of supervisory status by the Board in Adelphi University.
The Board noted in that case the concern of Congress as to the possi-
bility of a conflict of interest arising from inclusions of supervisors in
the same bargaining unit as their employees but realized:
[T]his does not mean, however, that a similar conflict of interest
is necessarily created whenever persons occasionally exercise some
authority over other employees of the employer. 116
The rationale behind this assertion is that the alliance with the em-
ployer, so far as the supervisory duties are concerned, are so nebulous
that the hybrid employee is not a supervisor with respect to basic loy-
alties. Further, the Board recognized the necessity for the avoidance of
supervisory isolation on the basis of a "sporadic exercise" of supervi-
sory authority over persons not within the unit.
Adelphi University contains the most thorough discussion by the
Board in this area and, perhaps, the most realistic approach to the
problem. In 1947, Congress did not consider the problem of the "hy-
brid" employee, as it had only just recognized the special status of su-
pervisors. Furthermore, that body's labor law contemplations were
solely within an industrial context.
As a result, the N.L.R.B. has confronted personnel and situations
outside the realm of those 1947 deliberations. The Board's creation of
a new class of labor personnel represents a pragmatic approach to the
realities of current labor relations. Although it does not follow the
wording of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board's interpreta-
tion is consistent with the Act's mandate to include as many American
laborers within the Act's protection as possible, while assuring the
employer of the loyalty of true supervisors. Allowing an employee
who only is temporarily clothed with supervisory authority to achieve
or maintain membership in a rank-and-file unit is also consistent
with the Board's "community of interest" standard. 117
Careful application of the "hybrid test," however, is required in
order to maintain the various protections afforded both to employers
and employees by the Act. This strict application was lacking in Uni-
versity of Chicago. Until that decision, whenever the Board had dealt
with hybrid employees, it consistently permitted supervisory member-
116. Id. at 644.
117. See Continental Baking Co., 99 N.LR.B. 777 (1952).
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ship in the rank-and-file unit, but only to the extent of the hybrid em-
ployees' nonsupervisory duties.""8 In Local 636, Plumbing and Pipe-
fitting Industry v. NLRB, 119 the Board objected to active union
participation by hybrid supervisors. In Nassau and Suffolk Contrac-
tors' Association,20 supervisors were prohibited from serving on a un-
ion bargaining team. Yet in University of Chicago, the Board did not
object to participation in union-management negotiations by two peo-
ple found to be supervisors of clerical employees.' 2'
Prior to this holding by the Board and as affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit, the N.L.R.B. followed congressional intent, when dealing
with supervisory personnel, of insuring that the loyalty of a supervisor
was with management. Permitting supervisors to participate on the
union side of a negotiating team is no longer a question of bending
strict statutory commands to fit new situations; it is in clear violation
of not just the letter, but the intent of the National Labor Relations
Act.
CONCLUSION
University of Chicago re-emphasizes the problems facing the
Board in nonstandard factual situations. The Board's earlier hybrid
employee problems of an industrial nature'22 are greatly magnified
when its jurisdiction is expanded, as it has been with universities. The
N.L.R.B. has recognized that higher education situations fit neither
within the industrial framework, nor within the contemplations of the
almost 20-year-old Labor Management Relations Act.
The Board has generally adopted a pragmatic approach in resolv-
ing the conflict between the strict wording of the Act and modern la-
bor-management problems. When the Board's decisions go beyond
ihis practical framework, and begin to subvert the intent of the Act as
it partially did in University of Chicago, congressional review is man-
dated.
MARK F. LEOPOLD
118. See text accompanying notes 73 and 84 supra.
119. 287 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1961); see text accompanying note 74 supra.
120. 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957). In that case involving 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), the
Board held that unlawful interference will be found when supervisors serve on a union
bargaining team, and the employer does not object to such a composition: "[Elmploy-
ees have the right to be represented in collective bargaining negotiations by individuals
who have a single-minded loyalty to their interests." Id. at 187. This has been ex-
tended to situations where supervisors assisted in the collection of union authorization
cards; see De Wolfe Metal Products Corp., 119 N.L.R.B. 659 (1957).
121. 204 N.L.R.B. No. 44, 83 L.R.R.M. 1678, 1681 (1973).
122. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970);
Great Western Sugar, 137 N.L.R.B. 551 (1962).
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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
Petitioner, ) Petition to Review and
No. 73-1788 vs. ) Modify and Cross-
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ) Application for
Respondent, ) Enforcement of an
and ) Order of the National
DISTRIBUTIVE WORKERS OF AMERICA, ) Labor Relations Board.
Intervenor. ) Case 13-CA-1 1447
I
The parent Union as an interested party to the proceeding below, however,
can seek review of the Board's order. It is aggrieved because four persons,
who otherwise could participate in union activities, have been classified as
supervisors of union members, and are ineligible for such participation.
In reviewing the reasonableness of the order, this court is bound to defer
to the Board's judgments in applying the act to union activities. N.L.R.B. v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963). It has long been established
that the Board owes no such deference to the Administrative Law Judge's
determination. See Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474,
492-496 (1951); P. R. Mallory and Co. v. N.L.R.B., 411 F.2d 948, 952
(7th Cir. 1969); J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 253 F.2d 149, 155-156 (7th
Cir. 1958. The statutory language places the responsibility of determining
what activities constitute an unfair labor practice squarely on the Board.
29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
The findings of the Board are supported by "substantial evidence" (29
U.S.C. § 169(0),and, therefore, the order will be enforced as written. First,
there is ample evidence to support the conclusion that all nine employees in
question were supervisors within the statutory definition. 29 U.S.C. §
152(11). Each of the nine controlled or directed the activities of other
employees of the University library. A primary duty of the Board is to
determine which employees fall within the definition of supervisor. N.L.R.B.
v. Swift & Co., 292 F. 2d 561, 563 (1st Cir. 1961).
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Second, the Board's conclusion that the activities of the five supervisors
who only supervised nonprofessionals did not constitute unfair labor practices
was reasonable. The Board's concern was that these five supervisors were
also employees and therefore entitled to section 7 rights. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
In balancing the Union's need -to be free from employer interference with the
right of employees to organize, the Board's decision that professional librarians
would not be coerced by other professionals who supervise only employees
outside the Union is reasonable. See Adelphi University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639,
643-644 (1972) (a director of admissions who had authority to recruit and
hire secretaries nevertheless was entitled to section 7 rights).
Third, the determination that active participation by the other four super-
visors in the affairs of Local 103A would violate section 8(1) and (2) is also
reasonable. Each of the four supervised other professionals who were mem-
bers of the Union. The activities of three of these supervisors-picketing,
participating as negotiating committee member, and attending a Union
national convention as a delegate--constituted interference with -the forma-
tion and organization of the local. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(1) and (2). Nassau
and Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 174, 187 (1957) (improper
for supervisors to serve on negotiating committee); see International Ass'n
of Machinists, Lodge 35 v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 72, 79-81 (1940); accord
Power Regulator Co. v. N.L.R.B., 355 F.2d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 1966);
N.L.R.B. v. Employing Bricklayers' Ass'n, 292 F. 2d 627, 629 (3rd Cir.
1961).
Finally, the University may properly be considered responsible for the
interference of its supervisors despite the absence of authorization. Local
636, Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Indus. v. N.L.R.B., 287 F.2d 354, 360
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
IV
The Union contends that this court should enter an order directing the
Board to proceed with a representation case. We do not have authority to
enter such an order. Our comment on the need for or desirability of a
representation case would be purely advisory.
In entering a judgment enforcing the order as written, we note that the
Board, both in its brief -and oral argument, assured us that the determination
of the supervisory status of the nine individuals is specifically limited to this
unfair labor practice proceeding and will not affect any determination of
supervisory status in a representation case concerning the University and Local
103A.
PETITION DENIED. CROSS-APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT
GRANTED.
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